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Abstract—In this correspondence, we study the secure multi-
antenna transmission with artificial noise (AN) under imperfect
channel state information in the presence of spatially randomly
distributed eavesdroppers. We derive the optimal solutions of
the power allocation between the information signal and the AN
for minimizing the secrecy outage probability (SOP) under a
target secrecy rate and for maximizing the secrecy rate under a
SOP constraint, respectively. Moreover, we provide an interesting
insight that channel estimation error affects the optimal power
allocation strategy in opposite ways for the above two objectives.
When the estimation error increases, more power should be
allocated to the information signal if we aim to decrease the
rate-constrained SOP, whereas more power should be allocated
to the AN if we aim to increase the SOP-constrained secrecy rate.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, artificial noise, multi-
antenna, secrecy outage, power allocation, imperfect CSI.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS), which achieves secure trans-
missions by exploiting the randomness of wireless channels,
has drawn considerable attention recently [1], [2]. It has
been shown that we are able to greatly improve PLS using
multi-antenna techniques with global channel state information
(CSI). However, to acquire the CSI of an eavesdropper is very
difficult in real wiretap scenarios, since the eavesdropper is
usually passive. Without the eavesdropper’s CSI, Goel et al.
[3] proposed a so-called artificial noise (AN) aided multi-
antenna transmission strategy, in which the transmitter masked
the information-bearing signal by injecting isotropic AN into
the null space of the main channel (from the transmitter to
a legitimate receiver), thus creating non-decodable interfer-
ence to potential eavesdroppers while without impairing the
legitimate receiver. This seminal work has unleashed a wave
of innovation [4]-[9], and the AN scheme has become a
promising approach to safeguarding wireless communications.
In practice, the CSI of the main channel is acquired by
training, channel estimation and feedback, which inevitably
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result in CSI imperfection. Some endeavors have studied the
AN scheme allowing for imperfect CSI. For example, robust
beamforming schemes have been proposed in [5] for MIMO
systems and in [6] for cooperative relay systems. The effects
of channel quantized feedback to the AN scheme are discussed
in [7] and [8], while in [9], training and feedback have been
jointly investigated and optimized.
However, all the aforementioned works ignored the uncer-
tainty of eavesdroppers’ spatial positions. Generally, eaves-
droppers are geographically distributed randomly, especially in
large-scale wireless networks. Analyzing secrecy performance
in such random wiretap scenarios is fundamentally different
from that with deterministic eavesdroppers’s locations.
Recently, stochastic geometry theory has provided a power-
ful tool to analyze network performance by modeling nodes’
positions according to some spatial distributions such as a
Poisson point process (PPP) [10]; it facilitates the study of the
AN scheme against random eavesdroppers [11]-[13]. However,
the impact of imperfect CSI on designing the AN is still an
open problem. Particularly, it is yet unknown what the optimal
power allocation strategy is, and how a channel estimation
error influences power allocation and secrecy performance.
Due to the complicated/implicit forms of the objective func-
tions caursed by location randomness and CSI imperfection,
previous works can only obtain the optimal power allocation
either by exhaustive search or by numerical calculation instead
of providing a tractable expression. This makes it challenging
to reveal an explicit analytical relationship between the optimal
power allocation and the channel estimation error. Our re-
search are motivated by the above observations and challenges.
In this correspondence, we study an AN-aided multi-input
single-output (MISO) secure transmission against randomly
located eavesdroppers under imperfect channel estimation. We
investigate two important performance metrics, namely, se-
crecy outage probability (SOP) and secrecy rate, respectively.
The SOP reflects the quality difference between the main and
wiretap channels; the secrecy rate measures the rate efficiency
of secure transmission. We provide the optimal power alloca-
tion strategies for the following optimization problems:
1) Minimizing the SOP subject to a secrecy rate constraint;
2) Maximizing the secrecy rate subject to a SOP constraint.
Furthermore, we draw an interesting conclusion that channel
estimation error influences the optimal power allocation in
opposite ways for the above two objectives. When the estima-
tion error increases, more power should be allocated to the
information signal if we aim to decrease the rate-constrained
SOP, whereas more power should be given to the AN if we
aim to increase the SOP-constrained secrecy rate.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to reveal
an explicit analytical relationship between the optimal power
2allocation and channel estimation error through strict math-
ematical proofs. Although existing works have also shown
that AN should be exploited to increase the secrecy rate
under imperfect CSI in point-to-point transmissions, their
conclusions are just extracted from simulations under specific
parameter settings, which may not apply to more general cases.
Notations: (·)†, (·)T, | · |, ‖ · ‖ denote conjugate, transpose,
absolute value, and Euclidean norm, respectively. CN denotes
the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and unit variance. Cm×n denotes the m×n complex
number domain.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a secure transmission from a transmitter (Alice)
to a legitimate receiver (Bob) overheard by randomly located
eavesdroppers (Eves)1. Alice has N antennas, Bob and Eves
each has a single antenna. Without loss of generality, we place
Alice at the origin and Bob at a deterministic position with a
distance rB from Alice. The locations of Eves are modeled as
a homogeneous PPP ΦE of density λE on a 2-D plane with
the k-th Eve a distance rk from Alice.
All wireless channels are assume to undergo flat Rayleigh
fading together with a large-scale path loss governed by the
exponent α > 2. The channel vector of a node with a distance
r from Alice is characterized as hr−α2 , where h ∈ CN×1
denotes the small-scale fading vector, with independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) entries hi ∼ CN .
We focus on a frequency-division duplex (FDD) system in
which the channel reciprocity no longer holds. We assume Bob
estimates the main channel with estimation errors, and sends
the estimated channel to Alice via an ideal feedback link (e.g.,
a high-quality link with negligible quantization error). In this
case, the exact main channel hb can be modeled as
hb =
√
1− τ2hˆb + τ h˜b, (1)
where hˆb and h˜b denote the estimated channel and estimation
error with i.i.d. entries hˆb,i, h˜b,i ∼ CN (0, 1). This assump-
tion arises from employing the minimum mean square error
(MMSE) estimation2 [5], [14]. Here, τ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
error coefficient; τ = 0 corresponds to a perfect channel
estimation, and τ = 1 means no CSI is acquired at all. For
each eavesdropper, although its CSI is unknown, we assume its
channel statistics information is available, which is a general
assumption when dealing with PLS [4]-[13].
Recalling the AN scheme in [3], the transmitted signal
vector x at Alice is designed in the form of
x =
√
ξPws+
√
(1 − ξ)P/(N − 1)Gv, (2)
where s is the information signal with E[|s|2] = 1, v ∈
C(N−1)×1 is an AN vector with i.i.d. entries vi ∼ CN , and ξ is
the power allocation ratio (PAR) of the desired signal power to
the total power P . w , hˆ†b/‖hˆb‖ is the beamforming vector
1This may correspond to such a scenario that a multi-antenna transmitter
Alice provides specific service to a specified subscriber Bob, while the service
should be kept secret to eavesdroppers (also named unauthorized users).
2 The Gaussian error model is a stochastic uncertainty model. Another
widely used model is the deterministic bounded error model, which is more
convenient for analyzing the quantized CSI [8].
for the information signal, G ∈ CN×(N−1) is a weighting
matrix for the AN. The columns of W , [w G] constitute an
orthogonal basis. Let s ,
[
s vT
]
, and the received signals at
Bob and the k-th Eve are given from (2)
yB =
√
1− τ2‖hˆb‖2r−
α
2
B s+ τ h˜bWs
Tr
−α2
B + nB︸ ︷︷ ︸
noB
, (3)
yk = he,kwr
−α2
k s+ he,kGvr
−α2
k + nk, ∀k ∈ ΦE , (4)
where he,k denotes the channel from Alice to the k-th Eve, and
noB combines the residual channel estimation error and thermal
noise. Without loss of generality, we assume nB, nk∈ΦE ∼
CN . The exact capacity expression of the main channel under
imperfect receiver CSI is still unavailable. A commonly used
approach is to examine a capacity lower bound by treating noB
as the worst-case Gaussian noise3. By doing so, the SINRs of
Bob and the k-th Eve are respectively given by
γB = ξκ(τ), (5)
γk =
ξP |hTe,kw|2r−αk
(1 − ξ)P‖hTe,kG‖2r−αk /(N − 1) + 1
, (6)
where κ(τ) = (1−τ
2)Pγ
τ2P+rαB
with γ , ‖hˆb‖2. Eq. (6) holds
for the pessimistic assumption that the k-th Eve has perfect
knowledge of both hˆb and h˜b. Given that τ ∈ [0, 1], κ(τ)
is a monotonically decreasing function of τ ; it reflects the
accuracy of channel estimation. Specifically, a small value of
κ(τ) corresponds to a low estimation accuracy and vice versa.
Hereafter, we omit τ from κ(τ) for notational brevity.
We consider the wiretap scenario in which each Eve in-
dividually decodes a secret message. This corresponds to a
compound wiretap channel model [17], and the capacities
of the main channel and the equivalent wiretap channel are
CB = log2(1 + γB) and CE = log2(1 + γE) with γE ,
maxk∈ΦE γk. Note that the capacity of Eves is determined
by the maximum capacity among all links connecting Alice
with Eves. As done in [4] and [13], after encoding secret
information, Alice transmits the codewords and embedded
secret messages at rates CB and RS , respectively. If at least
one Eve decodes the secret messages, i.e., CE exceeds the
rate CB − RS of redundant information (to protect from
eavesdropping), perfect secrecy is compromised and a secrecy
outage occurs; the corresponding SOP is defined as
O , P{CE > CB −RS}, ∀ CB > RS . (7)
In the following, we will optimize the PAR to minimize the
SOP under a target secrecy rate, and to maximize the secrecy
rate under a SOP constraint O ≤ ǫ ∈ (0, 1), respectively.
We emphasize that different from existing research with de-
terministic Eves’ positions, the analysis and design here is
much more complicated due to the extra spatial randomness.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY MINIMIZATION
In this section, we optimize the PAR that minimizes the SOP
under a target secrecy rate. Recalling (7), Alice transmits only
3 The tightness of this capacity lower bound was verified for Gaussian
inputs with MMSE channel estimation in [15], [16].
30 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Power Allocation Ratio, ξ
S
ec
re
cy
O
u
ta
g
e
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y,
O
 
 
Theory, M = 4
Theory, M = 6
Theory, M = 8
Simulation, M = 4
Simulation, M = 6
Simulation, M = 8
Fig. 1. SOP O vs. ξ for different values of M , with P = 10dBm, RS = 2,
τ = 0.3, and λE = 2. Unless otherwise specified, we set α = 4, rB = 1
(unit distance), and the unit of RS is bits/s/Hz.
when CB = log2(1 + ξκ) > RS , i.e., ξ > 2
RS−1
κ should hold
to guarantee a reliable connection between Alice and Bob. For
ease of notation, throughout the paper we define T , 2RS ,
ω , T−1κ , δ ,
2
α , β , πΓ (1 + δ), θ ,
T−1
T , and ϕ ,
ξ−1−1
N−1 .
The problem of minimizing O in (7) is formulated as
min
ξ
O, s.t. ω < ξ ≤ 1. (8)
Before proceeding to this optimization problem, we provide a
closed-form expression of O over the PPP network.
Lemma 1: If ξ > ω, the SOP defined in (7) is given by
O = 1− exp
(
−βλE
(
Pθ−1
)δ J (ξ)) , (9)
where J (ξ) = (ω−1 − ξ−1)−δ (1 + (ξω−1 − 1) θϕ)1−N .
Proof: Substitute CB and CE along with (5) and (6)
into (7), and after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
O = 1 − FγE (x) with x , 1+κξT − 1, where FγE (x) is the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γE , which is
FγE (x) = P
{
max
k∈ΦE
γk < x
}
= EΦE
[ ∏
k∈ΦE
P{γk < x}
]
(a)
= EΦE
[ ∏
k∈ΦE
(
1− e−
rαk x
Pξ (1 + ϕx)1−N
)]
(b)
= exp
(
−2πλE(1 + ϕx)1−N
∫ ∞
0
e−
rαx
Pξ rdr
)
= exp
(−βλE(Pξ)δx−δ(1 + ϕx)1−N ) , (10)
where (a) holds for the CDF of γk [4], and (b) holds for
the probability generating functional (PGFL) over a PPP [19].
Substituting (10) into O completes the proof.
The theoretical values ofO are well verified by Monte-Carlo
simulations, as shown in Fig. 1. We see that adding transmit
antennas is beneficial for decreasing the SOP. We also observe
that as ξ increases, O first decreases and then increases; there
exists a unique ξ that minimizes O. In the following we are
going to calculate the value of this unique ξ. From (9), it is
apparent that minimizing O is equivalent to minimizing J (ξ).
The first-order derivative of J (ξ) on ξ is given by
dJ (ξ)
dξ
=
θJ (ξ)(ξ3 + aξ2 + bξ + c)
ξ2 (ξ − ω) (ω + (ξ − ω)θϕ) , (11)
where a , −l1ω, b , − δθω2 − l0ω2 − l2ω, and c , l2ω2,
with l0 , δN−1 , l1 , 1 − l0, and l2 , 1 + l0. Let K(ξ) =
ξ3+aξ2+ bξ+ c. Since ξ > ω, the sign of dJ (ξ)dξ follows that
of K(ξ). In other words, to investigate the monotonicity of
J (ξ) on ξ, we need to just examine the sign of K(ξ). In the
following theorem, we provide the solution to problem (8).
Theorem 1: The optimal PAR that minimizes O in (8) is
ξ∗ =


∅, 0 < κ ≤ T − 1
1, T − 1 < κ ≤ (T − 1)
(
1 +
√
δ/θ
)
ξo, otherwise
(12)
where ξo = 3
√
q + p+ 3
√
q − p− a3 with p ,
√(
b
3 − a
2
9
)3
+ q2
and q , ab6 − c2 − 2a
3
54 , and a, b, c have been defined in (11).
ξ∗ = ∅ means that transmission is suspended.
Proof: We know that Alice transmits only when ξ > ω. 1)
If ω ≥ 1, i.e., κ ≤ T −1, no feasible ξ ∈ [0, 1] satisfies ξ > ω,
and transmission is suspended. 2) If ω < 1, Alice transmits in
the range of ξ ∈ (ω, 1]. Next, we derive the optimal value of
ξ that minimizes J (ξ).
We first prove the convexity of K(ξ) on ξ ∈ (ω, 1]. From
the expression of K(ξ), we have d2K(ξ)dξ2 = 6ξ − 2l1ω > 0,
i.e., K(ξ) is a convex function of ξ. Then we determine the
sign of K(ξ). The values of K(ξ) at boundaries ξ = ω and
ξ = 1 are K(ω) = − δθω3 and K(1) = (1 − ω)2 − δθω2,
respectively. Obviously, K(ω) < 0 always holds. Next, we
discuss the optimal value of ξ for the following two cases.
Case 1: K(1) ≤ 0. Since K(ξ) is convex on ξ ∈ (ω, 1],
K(ξ) or dJ (ξ)dξ is always negative. Hence J (ξ) monotonically
decreases with ξ, and the minimum J (ξ) is achieved at ξ = 1,
with the corresponding condition obtained from K(1) ≤ 0,
which is 1
1+
√
δ/θ
≤ ω < 1.
Case 2: K(1) > 0. It means K(ξ) or dJ (ξ)dξ becomes first
negative and then positive as ξ increases from ω to 1, i.e.,
J (ξ) first decreases and then increases with ξ, and the optimal
value of ξ is the unique root of the cubic equation K(ξ) = 0.
Solving this equation using Cardano’s formula yields ξo.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2 completes the proof.
Theorem 1 indicates that when the value of κ is small which
corresponds to a poor link quality or a large channel estimation
error, Alice either suspends the transmission or transmits with
full power. When the value of κ becomes large enough, it is
wise to create AN to decrease the SOP. The resulting minimum
SOP, denoted as O∗, is obtained by substituting ξ∗ into (9).
Next, we investigate the influence of channel estimation
error on the optimal PAR. Although we obtain a closed-form
expression of ξo in (12), it is complicated to reveal the explicit
connection between ξo and κ. Nevertheless, by leveraging
the equation K(ξo) = 0, we develop some insights into the
behavior of ξo with respect to κ in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: ξo monotonically decreases with κ.
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Fig. 2. Optimal PAR ξ∗ vs. error coefficient τ for different values of RS ,
with P = 0dBm, N = γ = 20, and λE = 2.
Proof: Since ω = T−1κ , to complete the proof, we need tojust prove the monotonicity of ξo on ω. Utilizing the derivative
rule for implicit functions [18] with K(ξo) = 0, we obtain
dξo
dω
=
−∂K/∂ω
∂K/∂ξo =
l1ξ
2
o + 2
δ
θωξo + 2l0ωξo + l2ξo − 2l2ω
3ξ2o − 2l1ωξo − δθω2 − l2ω − l0ω2
.
(13)
Substituting a, b and c defined in (11) into K(ξo) = 0 yields
δ
θ
=
(ξ2o + l0ωξo − l2ω)(ξo − ω)
ω2ξo
. (14)
Since ξo > ω and δθ > 0, the term ξ
2
o + l0ωξo − l2ω in (14)
satisfies the following inequality
0 < ξ2o+l0ωξo−l2ω < ξ2o+l0ξ2o−l2ω < l2(ξ20−ω)⇒ ξo >
√
ω.
Substituting δθ in (14) into (13) yields the numerator −∂K∂ω =
ξo
ω [l1ξo(ξo − ω) + l2(ξ2o − ω)] > 0 and denominator ∂K∂ξo =
l1ξo(ξo − ω) + l2ξo (ξ3o − ω2) > 0, hence we have
dξo
dω > 0.
Combined with ω = T−1κ , we directly obtain
dξo
dκ =
dξo
dω
dω
dκ <
0, which completes the proof.
Proposition 1 shows that, when the channel estimation error
gets larger, if we aim to decrease the SOP under a target
secrecy rate, we should increase the information signal power,
which is validated in Fig. 2. It is because that, in order to
minimize the SOP, we should first guarantee the link quality
of the main channel to support the target secrecy rate. Hence,
we should increase the information signal power to balance the
deterioration caused by the channel estimation error. When τ
exceeds a certain value, transmission is suspended, which is
just as analyzed previously. We also find from Fig. 2 that the
value of ξ∗ increases as RS increases, which can be easily
confirmed by the fact dξodT =
dξo
dω
dω
dT > 0.
Fig. 3 shows that the minimum SOP O∗ increases with τ .
For a given P , O∗ increases with RS . For a given RS , the two
curves with different values of P cross as τ increases (see the
intersection P). Specifically, before τ exceeds P , increasing
P decreases O∗, and after that the opposite happens. This
transition occurs because for too large an estimation error,
increasing transmit power does not significantly improve Bob’s
capacity, whereas it is of great benefit to Eves. This result
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implies that using full power is not always advantageous,
particularly when the estimation error is large.
IV. SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we optimize the PAR that maximizes the
secrecy rate subject to a SOP constraint. We first transform
the SOP constraint O ≤ ǫ into the following equivalent form
1−FγE
(
1 + κξ
2RS
− 1
)
(c)
≤ ǫ⇒ 1 + κξ
2RS
− 1 ≥ F−1γE (1− ǫ)
⇒ RS ≤ log2
1 + κξ
1 + ̺(ξ)ξ
, (15)
where (c) holds due to the monotonically increasing feature
of the CDF FγE (x) on x. ̺(ξ) ,
F−1γE
(1−ǫ)
ξ with F−1γE (·) the
inverse function of FγE (·). Clearly, a positive value of RS that
satisfies the SOP constraint (15) exits only when ̺(ξ) < κ.
The problem of maximizing RS can be formulated as
max
ξ
RS = log2
1 + κξ
1 + ̺(ξ)ξ
s.t. ̺(ξ) < κ, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. (16)
An illustration on the relationship between the secrecy rate
and the PAR is shown in Fig. 4. It is intuitive that increasing
the number of antennas helps to improve the secrecy rate. We
5observe that, RS first increases with ξ, then decreases with
it, and even reduces to zero for too large a ξ. This implies
we should carefully choose the PAR to achieve a high secrecy
rate.
From (16), we see that the value of RS is bottlenecked by
̺(ξ), which implicitly reflects the influence of the density of
PPP Eves λE and the SOP threshold ǫ. For example, a larger
λE or a smaller ǫ increases ̺(ξ) (see (9) and the definition of
̺(ξ)), and then decreases RS (see (16)). Therefore, ̺(ξ) plays
a critical role in maximizing RS . Although it is intractable to
obtain an analytical expression of ̺(ξ) due to the transcen-
dental equation 1 − FγE(ξ̺(ξ)) = ǫ (see (10)), we provide
an explicit connection between ̺(ξ) and ξ in the following
lemma, which is very critical for the subsequent optimization.
Lemma 2: ̺(ξ) is a monotonically increasing and convex
function of ξ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: For notational brevity, we omit ξ from ̺(ξ).
Plugging x = ξ̺ into 1−FγE (x) = ǫ yields
Z(ξ, ̺)− L = 0, (17)
where Z(ξ, ̺) = ̺δ
(
1 + ̺ 1−ξN−1
)N−1
, and L , βλEP
δ
− ln(1−ǫ) .
Using the derivative rule for implicit functions with (17), the
first- and second-order derivatives of ̺ on ξ are given by
d̺
dξ
= −∂Z/∂ξ
∂Z/∂̺ =
̺2
δ + l2(1− ξ)̺ , (18)
d2̺
dξ2
=
2
̺
(
d̺
dξ
)2
+
l2̺
2
(
̺− (1 − ξ)d̺dξ
)
(δ + l2(1− ξ)̺)2
. (19)
Clearly, d̺dξ > 0 always holds. With (18), we have ̺ − (1 −
ξ)d̺dξ =
δ̺+l0(1−ξ)̺
2
δ+l2(1−ξ)̺
> 0 in (19). Removing the second term
from the right-hand side of (19) yields d2̺dξ2 > 2̺
(
d̺
dξ
)2
> 0.
With d̺dξ > 0 and
d2̺
dξ2 > 0, we complete the proof.
Lemma 2 indicates the maximum value of ̺(ξ) is achieved
at ξ = 1, which is ̺max = ̺(1) = L1/δ from (17). Besides,
it is clearly that Z(ξ, ̺) − L monotonically increases with ̺
for a given ξ. Generally, we can calculate the unique value of
̺(ξ) that satisfies (17) using the bisection method in the range
[0, ̺max]. For the special case of large antennas, i.e., N →∞,
we provide an approximate value of ̺(ξ), denoted as ̺o(ξ).
Simulation results show that, when N ≥ 20, the maximum
value of RS calculated based on ̺o(ξ) is quite close to that
based on the exact ̺(ξ), i.e., ̺o(ξ) can be a computationally
convenient alternative to ̺(ξ) when N is large.
Corollary 1: As N →∞, ̺(ξ) in (17) approximates to
̺o(ξ) =


L1/δ, ξ = 1
δ
1−ξ ln
(
δ−1(1−ξ)L1/δ
W(δ−1(1−ξ)L1/δ)
)
, otherwise
(20)
where W(·) is the Lambert-W function.
Proof: Since limN→∞
(
1 + xN
)−N
= e−x, we have
Z(ξ, ̺o) = (̺o)δe(1−ξ)̺o where ̺o , limN→∞ ̺, and (17)
transforms to L = (̺o)δe(1−ξ)̺o . 1) When ξ = 1, we
easily obtain ̺o = L 1δ . 2) When ξ 6= 1, we find that
1−ξ
δ L
1
δ = (1−ξ)̺
o
δ e
(1−ξ)̺o
δ
. Let µ , 1−ξδ ̺
o
, and we obtain
1−ξ
δ L
1
δ = µeµ ⇒ e 1−ξδ L
1
δ = eµe
µ
. We further let ν , eµ and
t , e
1−ξ
δ L
1
δ
, such that νν = t ⇒ ν = ln t
W(ln t) . The solution
̺o can be given by ̺o = 1−ξδ µ =
1−ξ
δ ln ν, with yields the
final expression in (20) by substituting in ν along with t.
Due to the implicit function of ̺(ξ) on ξ, we can hardly
derive an explicit expression of RS . Nevertheless, we still
reveal the concavity of RS on ξ, and provide the solution
to problem (16) in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: RS in (16) is a concave function of ξ. The
optimal ξ that maximizes RS is given by
ξ∗ =


∅, κ ≤ ̺min
1, κ > δL
α/2+Lα
δ−Lα and L <
α
√
δ
ξr, otherwise
(21)
where ̺min , ̺(0) denotes the minimum value of ̺(ξ). ξr is
the unique root of dRSdξ = 0, where
dRS
dξ
=
1
ln 2
[
κ
1 + κξ
− ̺(ξ) +
ξd̺(ξ)
dξ
1 + ξ̺(ξ)
]
. (22)
Proof: Alice transmits only when ̺ < κ. Obviously, if
κ ≤ ̺min, then ̺ < κ never holds for an arbitrary ̺ since
̺min ≤ ̺, such that transmission is suspended. If κ > ̺min,
Alice transmits for a ξ that satisfies ̺ < κ. To maximize RS ,
we first give the second-order derivative of RS on ξ from (16)
d2RS
dξ2
=
1
ln 2

 −κ2
(1 + κξ)2
− 2
d̺
dξ + ξ
d2̺
dξ2
(1 + ̺ξ)
+
(
̺+ ξ d̺dξ
)2
(1 + ̺ξ)2

 ,
with d̺dξ and
d2̺
dξ2 given in Lemma 2. Substituting
d2̺
dξ2 >
2
̺
(
d̺
dξ
)2
> 0 (see Lemma 2) into the above equation yields
d2RS
dξ2
< − 1
ln 2
(
κ2
(1 + κξ)2
− ̺
2
(1 + ̺ξ)2
)
. (23)
Since ̺ < κ, we have κ2(1+κξ)2 − ̺
2
(1+̺ξ)2 > 0 ⇒ d
2RS
dξ2 < 0,
i.e., RS is a concave function of ξ.
Due to the concavity of RS on ξ, the maximum value of
RS is achieved either at boundaries or at stationary points.
From (22), the boundary values are dRSdξ |ξ=0 = κ−̺minln 2 and
dRS
dξ |ξ=1 = 1ln 2
(
κ
1+κ −
Lα/2+α2 L
α
1+Lα/2
)
. Obviously, dRSdξ |ξ=0 >
0. 1) If dRSdξ |ξ=1 > 0, RS monotonically increases with ξ, and
the optimal value of ξ is 1, with the corresponding condition
directly obtained from dRSdξ |ξ=1 > 0. 2) If dRSdξ |ξ=1 ≤ 0, RS
first increases and then decreases with ξ, and the optimal value
of ξ is the unique root of dRsdξ = 0.
Theorem 2 shows only for a large κ (small estimation error)
and a small L (a sparse-eavesdropper scenario or a moderate
SOP constraint), allocating full power to the information signal
provides a higher secrecy rate than the AN scheme does,
otherwise generating AN is advantageous. Since RS is a
concave function of ξ, we can efficiently calculate the unique
root ξr of dRSdξr = 0 in (22) using the bisection method.
Substituting ξ∗ and ̺(ξ∗) into (16) yields R∗S .
6Although ξr can only be calculated numerically, we show
how ξr is affected by κ in the following.
Proposition 2: ξr in (21) monotonically increases with κ.
Proof: From (22), dRSdξr = 0 transforms to A(ξr) = 0, and
A(ξr) = (κξ2r−l0ξr+l2)̺2r+(l2κξr − l2κ+ δ) ̺r−δκ, (24)
with ̺r , ̺(ξr). Using the derivative rule for implicit
functions with the equation A(ξr) = 0 yields
dξr
dκ
= − ∂A/∂κ
∂A/∂ξr = −
̺2rξ
2
r − (δ + l2(1− ξr)̺r)
ψ1(ξr) + ψ2(ξr)
d̺r
dξr
, (25)
where ψ1(ξr) = (1 + 2κξr)̺2r + l2(κ − ̺r)̺r and ψ2(ξr) =
2
(
κξ2r + l2
)
̺r + (l2κξr + δ) − 2l0ξr̺r − l2κ. Obviously,
κ > ̺r ⇒ ψ1(ξr) > 0 and d̺rdξr > 0 (see Lemma 2).A(ξr) = 0
can be further reformed as
(
κξ2r + l2)̺r + (l2κξr + δ
)
=
l0ξr̺r + l2κ +
δκ
̺r
, substituting which into ψ2(ξr) directly
yields ψ2(ξr) > 0. Hence we have ∂A∂ξr > 0. Leveraging (22),
dRS
dξr
= 0 can be reformed by ξ2r d̺rdξr = 1 −
1+̺rξr
1+κξr
< 1.
Substituting d̺rdξr in (18) into this inequality yields ̺2rξ2r <
(δ + l2(1− ξr)̺r), i.e., ∂A∂κ < 0. With ∂A∂ξr > 0 and ∂A∂κ < 0,
we see from (25) that dξrdκ > 0, which completes the proof.
Proposition 2 indicates that, when channel estimation error
becomes larger, if we aim to increase the secrecy rate under
a SOP constraint, we should increase the AN power, just
as shown in Fig. 5. The reason is: channel estimation error
heavily degrades the main channel while has no effect on
the wiretap channels. For a large estimation error, although
increasing the information signal power improves Bob’s ca-
pacity, the improvement is not significant. On the contrary,
increasing AN power always greatly deteriorates the wiretap
channels regardless of CSI imperfection. Therefore, when
estimation error becomes larger, increasing AN power is more
beneficial to the secrecy rate than increasing signal power.
Nevertheless, transmission is suspended if τ exceeds a certain
value, which corresponds to the case κ ≤ ̺min as indicated
in Theorem 2. We can also prove dξrdλE < 0 and
dξr
dǫ > 0 in a
similar way as the proof of Proposition 2. Due to space limit,
we omit the relevant proofs, and the results are verified in
Fig. 5. We see that the optimal PAR ξ∗ decreases for a larger
λE or a smaller ǫ. It means that, when transmission is more
vulnerable to wiretapping, we should increase AN power.
Fig. 6 depicts the maximum secrecy rate R∗S versus τ . The
approximated value of R∗S is quite close to the exact one. We
observe that R∗S monotonically decreases with τ . Interestingly,
R∗S increases with P at the small τ region, whereas decreases
with it at the large τ region. The underlying reason is just
similar to the explanation for the intersection in Fig. 3.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this correspondence, we investigate the AN-aided multi-
antenna transmission under imperfect CSI against PPP Eves.
We provide explicit solutions of the optimal PARs with
channel estimation errors for minimizing the SOP under a
secrecy rate constraint and for maximizing the secrecy rate
subject to a SOP constraint, respectively. We strictly prove
that, when the channel estimation error becomes larger, we
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Fig. 5. Optimal PAR ξ∗ versus τ for different values of λE and ǫ, with
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versus τ for different values of P , with
N = γ = 20, λE = 2, and ǫ = 0.01. “Approx” corresponds to the value of
̺o(ξ) in (20) as opposed to the exact value of ̺(ξ) obtained from (17).
should increase the information signal power if we aim to
decrease the SOP, whereas we should increase the AN power
if we aim to increase the secrecy rate.
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